NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AWARDED TO INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

CHRISTIANIA, December 10, 1904-12-10. — The Nobel Peace Prize for the present year has been awarded to the Institute of International Law, the independent association of jurists whose labours are directed towards placing the intercourse of nations upon a firmer foundation of recognised rules. The distinction honours neither a sovereign nor the negotiator of a particular treaty, but a continuing body of legal scholarship and counsel. At a moment when Russia and Japan remain engaged in a grievous war, the Norwegian committee has turned attention to the less conspicuous work by which disputes may be submitted to judgment and the conduct of hostilities brought under restraint.

The award is made under the testament of Alfred Nobel, which entrusted the selection of the peace laureate to a committee of five persons chosen by the Norwegian Storting. Nobel named among the objects deserving recognition work for “fraternity between nations,” the reduction of standing armies, and the promotion of peace congresses. The committee's choice this year gives prominence to the legal foundations upon which such endeavours must rest. A conference may announce an intention and a treaty record a bargain; jurists must still examine what the undertaking means, where its obligations begin, and how an alleged breach can be judged.

The Institute dates from September 8, 1873, when eleven jurists assembled at Ghent to establish a permanent association for the scientific study and advancement of international law. Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, the Belgian lawyer, was a principal mover in its creation. Among the founding company were Johann Caspar Bluntschli, the Swiss-born professor working in Germany, and Gustave Moynier of Geneva, already closely associated with the Red Cross undertaking. Their enterprise brought together men of different countries in a field too often treated as the exclusive possession of diplomatic chancelleries. Its authority was to arise from learning and deliberation rather than governmental appointment.

The distinction is important. The Institute is not a court, and its members cannot summon a Government, deliver an enforceable sentence against it, or compel the payment of compensation. Its statutes describe an association “without any official character,” formed to promote the progress of international law. It pursues that purpose through study, discussion, and resolutions upon questions which concern the society of States. The absence of official character limits its powers, but also permits its members to examine principles without waiting for instructions from a Foreign Office. The prize recognises that independent labour; it does not confer any new jurisdiction.

One conspicuous example of the Institute's method is the manual upon the laws of war on land adopted at Oxford in 1880. This work sought to set out rules capable of informing national legislation and military instruction. The problem is practical as well as learned. An agreement between Governments is of uncertain value if the officer in the field does not know what it requires concerning prisoners, wounded men, civilians, or property in occupied territory. The Oxford undertaking belongs to the effort to make legal obligations intelligible before an emergency arises, rather than to discover them only after injury has been done.

Such work follows a generation in which international agreement has made notable, though incomplete, advances. The Geneva Convention of 1864 established treaty provisions for the care of wounded soldiers and the protection of those attending them. The arbitration at Geneva in the Alabama dispute between Great Britain and the United States demonstrated that a quarrel involving national honour and substantial claims could be submitted to an international tribunal. Neither achievement abolished war or removed every occasion of discord. Both nevertheless supplied practical evidence against the contention that relations between powerful States must always be determined by threats, armaments, or the hazards of battle.

The Hague Conference of 1899 carried this movement further, providing machinery for international arbitration and adopting conventions concerning the conduct of war. The Permanent Court of Arbitration established through that settlement is not a standing bench continuously hearing causes; it supplies arrangements through which States may constitute tribunals for disputes they agree to submit. That dependence upon consent remains a central limitation. Yet the existence of machinery matters. It enables a Government seeking a peaceful settlement to propose a recognised procedure, instead of having first to invent one amid the suspicions and public excitement produced by the dispute itself.

The present political circumstances give the award a sharp significance. In October, Russian warships proceeding towards the Far East fired upon British fishing vessels in the North Sea, killing two fishermen and sinking a trawler. The occurrence at the Dogger Bank brought Great Britain and Russia into a dangerous controversy. By the declaration signed at Paris on November 25, the two Governments agreed to refer the circumstances to an international commission of inquiry. That commission has yet to perform its task. Nevertheless, the recourse to investigation illustrates the immediate need for procedures which can separate disputed facts from accusation before an incident becomes a wider conflict.

There is no warrant for treating today's honour as an endorsement of either belligerent in the war in the East, or as a judgment upon the North Sea affair. Its object is an institution whose work extends beyond any single dispute. Nor does the award itself alter a treaty, reduce a fleet, or settle a claim. Its political consequence lies rather in the public standing it gives to the proposition that rules between nations deserve sustained and independent cultivation. Governments retain the decision whether to accept proposed obligations; the Institute can prepare and recommend, but it cannot substitute its resolutions for their assent.

The immediate prospect is therefore one of continued labour rather than a proclaimed settlement. Questions of arbitration, neutrality, military occupation, and the protection of those not engaged in fighting remain matters of urgent concern. The prize gives recognition to men whose conclusions may receive less notice than a minister's speech, yet may help furnish the terms in which a later agreement becomes possible. With armies still in the field and the siege of Port Arthur continuing, no observer can mistake legal progress for accomplished peace. Christiania's announcement nevertheless affirms that the patient formulation of international law is itself a service to the peace of nations.